According to Alexius Meinong, in order to give a philosophical explanation of the world we need to consider both existent and nonexistent objects, lest we fall into the "prejudice in favour of the real". The paper starts by examining some basic concepts of object theory seen as an existence-free science (modes of being, principle of independence of so-being from being, "Aussersein" and Meinong's paradox). There follows an exposition of Bertrand Russell's position, characterized by a "robust sense of reality", and afterwards (...) an analysis of differences and similarities between the two philosophers. The paper ends with a short account of Meinongian semantics and a comparison between object theory and metaphysics. (shrink)

Starting with the philosophical reflections of the Italian writer C. E. Gadda, the paper offers a criticism of the traditional concept of an individual as something which is determinate, separate and autonomous. Gadda argues that an individual should be understood as an element which is in a multiplicity of relations with the other elements of the system inside of which it exists. The idea is developed on the basis of Spinoza's 'Ethics', but it shares many affinities with Peirce's notions of (...) an individual and of a continuum. Taking its cue from Peirce's ideas, which are here discussed in relation to Aristotle and Kant, the paper proposes to construe an individual as a continuum, that is as something which is in a continuity of reactions and relations with the objects of the phenomenological (spatial-temporal) context in which it exists and with those of the dialectical context, that is that net of objects which can be identified starting from the relational properties of the object. (shrink)

Il cosiddetto “paradosso della finzione” nasce dal tentativo di spiegare quale tipo di emozioni proviamo verso quegli oggetti che troviamo nei romanzi e nei film e che sappiamo perfettamente essere fittizi. Si tratta di un paradosso classico, tornato alla ribalta nel 1975 dopo la pubblicazione di un articolo di Colin Radford che partiva precisamente dall’interrogativo riguardante le lacrime che versiamo per ciò che non è reale (come un personaggio fittizio, appunto). Perché ci commuoviamo per il suicidio di Anna Karenina se (...) sappiamo che non esiste? Che differenza c’è tra piangere per Anna Karenina, piangere per una bugia, piangere per la depressione e fare finta di piangere perché si vuol fare credere a chi ci guarda che siamo sinceramente commossi? In Piangere e ridere davvero (2009) Maurizio Ferraris offre un’interessante proposta teorica per dissolvere il paradosso in questione e si sofferma su alcune distinzioni fondamentali riguardanti le nostre reazioni emotive a stimoli reali e fittizi. In questo saggio si prende spunto dalla teoria di Ferraris e ci si propone di chiarire che cosa significhi fare finta di rispondere emotivamente a qualcosa nella vita di tutti i giorni e quale sia la differenza tra queste “finte” emozioni e quelle che invece proviamo durante la fruizione di opere che sappiamo essere di finzione. Saranno scelti come esempi paradigmatici il caso Fenaroli (al centro della cronaca italiana alla fine degli anni Cinquanta), Il vedovo di Dino Risi e Scusate il ritardo di Massimo Troisi. (shrink)

Nel giardino floreale dell’Isola Che Non C’è si scontrano Lafcadio e Termidoro, due strani tipi sempre preoccupati di farsi riconoscere e di fare accettare gli oggetti delle loro ricerche. Non sono come gli studiosi d’un tempo, impegnati a costruire grandi sistemi e a inventare nuovi modi di pensare e di parlare, loro fanno piccole ricerche su oggetti particolari, si chiedono se esistono o se non esistono, come sono costruiti, di quali elementi sono composti, di che cosa hanno bisogno per con...

Focusing mainly on Meinong’s "Über emotionale Präsentation" and Veber’s "Die Natur des Sollens", I examine their respective conceptions of ought. Meinong has not written a specific work on the ought, he deals with it as a part of his value theory. In "Über emotionale Präsentation" the ought is a property of being, which cannot be viewed as separated from a desiring subject. The ought is an ideal object of higher order; it concerns neither factuality nor non-factuality, but subfactuality, that is (...) the realm of possibility. In "Die Natur des Sollens", Veber proposes a structured theory of ought, which is grounded on Meinongian concepts. The ought is the object of a volition, it is a genuine object, even though ideal. I conclude by portraying the differences between Veber's and Meinong's conceptions of the ought. (shrink)

The paper discusses critically the evolution of Lipps's view on logic and psychology. According to Lipps, psychology is the fundamental science on which the other sciences are grounded, and "logic is a special discipline of psychology". Husserl criticizes such conception, which falls into a confusion of domains, and proposes the idea of a pure logic on the basis of the distinction between ideal and real. Lipps replies to Husserl maintaining that the overcoming of psychologism requires both a sharp separation of (...) object and content and a distinction of the different meanings of psychology. The latter is, according to Lipps, not an empirical science, but the science of the self, pure psychology, i.e., something like Aristotle's first philosophy; as such, psychology is the ground of logic: the laws of logic are valid both for thought and for objects, but they are facts of consciousness and hence they belong to psychology. Finally, an evaluation is given of various interpretations of Lipps's attempts to overcome psychologism. (shrink)

According to Paolo D’Angelo my Philosophy of Literature actually is an Analytical Philosophy of Literature. His main worry does not concern simply the title, but the fact of my having consciously excluded some authors just because, he maintains, they are not analytic philosophers. In this note I try to explain my reasons together with a defense of philosophy of literature in its own peculiarity distinguishing it from literary criticism, literature in philosophy and philosophy as literature.

Nel 1856 Madame Bovary esce a puntate sulla «Revue de Paris» (1° ottobre - 15 dicembre), per comparire poi in versione integrale un anno dopo – in seguito all’assoluzione di Gustave Flaubert, avvenuta il 7 febbraio – presso l’editore Lévy. Il titolo dell’opera, molto semplice, è decisamente in linea con il realismo: l’autore si mette da parte, rinunciando alla propria voce e alla propria opinione, per fare parlare direttamente i personaggi e gli eventi che li riguardano. Infatti il titolo non...

In Meinong’s object theory there is, alongside a classificatory aspect, one having to do with degrees, increase and variation. This other aspect comes out of Meinong’s intention of extending his object theory’s aprioristic method to the empirical world. The forms of ‘more’ and ‘less’ concerning psychical experiences are first investigated; they consist in degrees of certainty of judgment and of shadiness (Schattenhaftigkeit) and seriousness (Ernstartigkeit) of imaginary representations and assumptions. Secondly, forms of variability regarding objects are shown, specifically the incompleteness (...) (Unvollständigkeit) of the objects of representations and the subfactuality (Untertatsächlichkeit) of the objectives, i.e., the objects of judgments and assumptions. There is a correspondence between such variability in objects and a variability in psychical experiences. Finally, an application of such concepts to fictional objects is proposed. (shrink)

The theses exposed by Alexius Meinong in two newspaper articles in 1873 are taken as the paradigm of a feeling that was common to young Austrian intelligentsia. Meinong upholds a conception of life as struggle and of history as a series of struggles among nations. In his view, the defence of the interests of a people is absolute and generates conflicts among nations that will increasingly dominate future scenarios. The concept of nation has an identification function inward and one of (...) dissociation outward. This discourse is contextualised within the framework of the various student corporations of the University of Vienna, where the new ruling class was forming which, despite different political ideas, was united by nationalism. Finally, the paper analyses the opposing views of Eric J. Hobsbawm and Anthony D. Smith on the idea of nation and suggests some similarities between the Habsburg Empire and the European Union. (shrink)

The paper examines the constitutive rule of the Documentality (object = written act), its explanatory power, and the role that writing and relations play in it. The social object is explained as a hybrid object, of higher order, consisting of heterogeneous parts; its identity is determined, amongst other things, by the relations it entertains with other entities. In the second part, after criticizing Searle’s notion of collective intentionality, which fails to explain conflict situations, the article focuses on some political implications (...) of social ontology, examining the role of immigrants sans papiers. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to apply Meinong’s theory of signs to an analysis of literary texts. The focus lies on words and sentences which, according to Meinong, expressing fantasy experiences when they occur in literary texts. He distinguishes between “serious-like” and “shadow-like” fantasy experiences. The former can be detached from their fictional context, i.e., they are also understandable in other contexts. The latter, instead, are dependent on their fictional contexts. This implies that shadow-like fantasy experiences are less specific (...) than serious-like ones. The objects presented by these experiences are the meanings of the signs involved. The definiteness of the experience is related to the completeness of the object; consequently, objects involved in shadow-like experiences are incomplete. In addition to be incomplete, fictional objects can be defined as non-existent objects of higher order, which come into the world through linguistic expression and are tied to the context(s) in which the fantasy has placed them. (shrink)

Il lavoro si interroga principalmente sul significato di «verità effettuale della cosa». Dopo aver esaminato la nozione di vero da un punto di vista semantico e gnoseologico – nel primo senso, è vero, secondo Machiavelli, il discorso che riscontra le cose, nel secondo, il discorso che si fonda sull’esperienza, intesa come esperienza sia diretta (vissuta e osservata) che mediata (letta e ascoltata) –, giunge a definire la «verità effettuale della cosa» come «il discorso storicamente e empiricamente verificabile negli effetti, o (...) nei fatti, che concerne la cosa in oggetto, ossia lo stato». A questo si contrappone «l’immaginazione della cosa», il discorso che, mancando del riscontro delle cose e di esperienza dello stato, non può che ricorrere all’immaginazione, la quale svolge pertanto la funzione di un surrogato. Ma l’immaginazione non è solo fonte di inganni, in un altro senso svolge un ruolo altamente positivo: l’immaginazione che muove dal riscontro permette di individuare un «rimedio» possibile per «questo guasto mondo»; e consente al principe, nella situazione contingente, di agire e apparire anche contro i dettami di una certa mortale, se necessario. L’individuazione di un rimedio possibile e l’attuazione di un agire necessario, contrapposti al pericolo incombente della rovina, richiedono la conoscenza delle regole e leggi dell’agire politico. La verità come coerenza, coerenza del discorso che risulta dall’esame dell’agire storico e politico, ossia coerenza delle argomentazioni machiavelliane che traducono in proposizioni l’agire politico, nella fattispecie, quello del principe, è condizione necessaria, anche se non sufficiente, per preservarsi dalla rovina e mantenere uno stato. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz distinguishes three formulations of the principle of contradiction in Aristotle’s works: ontological, logical, and psychological. The first two formulations are equivalent though not synonymous, but neither of them is equivalent to the psychological one, which expresses not a principle but only an empirical law. Furthermore, the principle of contradiction is neither a simple and ultimate law nor is it necessary for conducting an inference, because the syllogism is independent of it. The further explanation of this concept leads Łukasiewicz to (...) formulate the idea of a non-Aristotelian logic, that is, a logic operating without the principle of contradiction. If the principle of contradiction shall be valid, it must be proved. A proof can be supplied only on the basis of a definition of object, as something that cannot have and not have the same property at the same time. However, this definition does not hold for all objects, i.e., for contradictory objects. In virtue of its ontological character the Aristotelian principle of contradiction is then different from that of symbolic logic. (shrink)

This volume examines the entire logical and philosophical production of Nikolai A. Vasil’ev, studying his life and activities as a historian and man of letters. Readers will gain a comprehensive understanding of this influential Russian logician, philosopher, psychologist, and poet. The author frames Vasil’ev’s work within its historical and cultural context. He takes into consideration both the situation of logic in Russia and the state of logic in Western Europe, from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of (...) the 20th. Following this, the book considers the attempts to develop non-Aristotelian logics or ideas that present affinities with imaginary logic. It then looks at the contribution of traditional logic in elaborating non-classical ideas. This logic allows the author to deal with incomplete objects just as imaginary logic does with contradictory ones. Both logics are objects of interesting analysis by modern researchers. (shrink)

Gli oggetti fittizi sono quegli oggetti presenti nelle opere di finzione, dalla letteratura al cinema, dal teatro ai dipinti. Questo saggio prende in con­siderazione, prevalentemente, gli oggetti della finzione letteraria. Tali og­getti pongono interessanti quesiti tanto sul versante ontologico quanto sul versante semantico: in primo luogo occorre fare chiarezza sulle condizioni alle quali essi possono legittimamente essere considerati degli oggetti, in se­condo luogo è importante individuare il valore semantico degli enunciati de­signanti oggetti di tal sorta e infine è in­di­spensabile esplicitare (...) lo statuto on­tologico di tali entità al fine di spiegare come avviene che pro­viamo emo­zioni nei loro confronti.Fictional entities are those entities we find in fictional works, from li­te­rature to cinema, from theatre to paintings. This essay will mostly concern li­terary fictional entities. These entities pose interesting questions both for se­mantics and for ontology: first we need to clarify the conditions ac­cording to which they can legitimately be considered as objects, secondly we need to understand the semantical value of sentences referring to ob­jects of that sort, and finally we need to emphasize the importance of those en­tities in order to explain how does it happen that we prove emotions to­wards them. (shrink)

Nonostante Don Chisciotte e Madame Bovary si siano rovinati (letteralmente) la vita a forza di leggere romanzi, è opinione condivisa che le opere letterarie possano essere molto importanti, se non addirittura fondamentali, quale fonte di conoscenza. Non è quindi per caso che si comincino a leggere le storie ai bambini piccoli, che se ne richieda la lettura ai ragazzi a scuola e si cerchi di sensibilizzare il più possibile al mondo dei libri, perché, come diceva Umberto Eco, «[…] la nostra (...) ric... (shrink)

C’è una domanda che sorge spontaneamente: perché mai dovremmo essere interessati a generi di opere quali il terrore e la tragedia? Com’è possibile che questi generi continuino a persistere? Come possiamo spiegare la loro stessa esistenza? O meglio, perché mai qualcuno dovrebbe voler provare emozioni negative quali la paura, il terrore e la tristezza? Poi, come funziona, che più c’è da soffrire e più gli spettatori sono contenti? Si ammetterà che, se le cose stanno davvero così, si tratta di u...

“Naturalismo” è una parola che si dice in molti modi, almeno tanti quanti nella storia della filosofia e nel sentire comune sono i modi in cui si è parlato di “natura” e di espressioni simili. Oggi, il tema del naturalismo in filosofia e della cosiddetta naturalizzazione che una filosofia dovrebbe eventualmente attrezzare determinate nozioni e teorie è tornato prepotentemente alla ribalta della riflessione filosofica, sulla scia dei successi provenienti dalle scienze cognitive (linguistica, n...

Dopo Per un’estetica del cibo (2006) e L’altro gusto (2008), Nicola Perullo torna sul tema, tanto interessante quanto spesso trascurato, della filosofia della gastronomia, prendendo questa volta in esame l’esperienza del gusto. Superato brillantemente il pregiudizio secondo il quale sarebbe meglio non occuparsi degli oggetti gastronomici in quanto “meramente empirici”, Nicola Perullo entra nel vivo dell’indagine domandandosi che cosa propriamente sia implicato dall’atto di gustare, che cosa s...

«In un luogo molto lontano, in un tempo non troppo lontano, un artista dalla chioma bianca ha esposto in una galleria un oggetto particolare di nome Brillo Box. Brillo Box era un oggetto diverso da tutti gli altri. Non era una semplice scatola di spugnette abrasive come quelle che ci sono al supermercato. Infatti non era di cartone, bensì di legno, e aveva dimensioni differenti. Ma il punto non era, ovviamente, questo. Il punto era che Brillo Box doveva essere visto (...) come un’opera d’arte, anch... (shrink)

1 Il Brillo Box Alla Galleria Stable di New York, nel 1964, è stata esposta per la prima volta l’opera di Andy Warhol, Brillo Box. Secondo Arthur Danto, la ragione per la quale non si tratta di una semplice scatola di spugnette abrasive (al di là del fatto che quella di Warhol è di dimensioni differenti, non è di cartone, bensì di legno, e poi, ovviamente, non contiene il prodotto pubblicizzato all’esterno) è che tale oggetto deve essere letto (per non (...) dire “visto”) alla luce di una determina... (shrink)

Stories express hypotheses, interpretations of the world that have a certain degree of probability. To demonstrate this thesis I have adopted the notion of hypothesis, in a sense very close to the Meinongian concept of assumption, and a ‘metric’ conception of the values of the truth or falsity of a proposition – as that has been proposed in several ways by Peirce, Vasil’ev and Meinong. To show the the cognitive value of literary texts, and therefore their truth value, I take (...) my move from chapter 9 of Aristotle’s Poetics, where he holds that poetry is imitative of reality, not in the sense of history – which relates what has happened – but rather, in so far as it expresses “the kinds of things that might happen, that is, that could happen because they are either probable or necessary.” The probable admits variations of degree. By means of an examination of the Meinongian concepts of assumption and objective (i.e. state of affairs), which also allow different modes of gradation, I introduce, with examples drawn from Dante’s Divine Comedy and The Description (Tradimento) by Machiavelli, a theory of degrees of truth that makes it possible to apply the concept of probability to literary as well as to historical texts. Finally, I connect the universal character of the literary text with the ontological notion of incomplete object and argue that a fictional object, as it is incomplete, is not an individual but a type. (shrink)

In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing especially on "Über emotionale Präsentation", I examine, on the one hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the capacity to attract (...) aesthetic experiences to themselves. Hence, they are connected to emotions, being what is presented by them. These results are achieved on the basis of a fundamental analogy between the domain of value and the aesthetic domain. Finally, the notion of an absolute beauty is discussed. (shrink)

“Naturalismo” è una parola che si dice in molti modi, almeno tanti quanti nella storia della filosofia e nel sentire comune sono i modi in cui si è parlato di “natura” e di espressioni simili. Oggi, il tema del naturalismo in filosofia e della cosiddetta naturalizzazione che una filosofia dovrebbe eventualmente attrezzare determinate nozioni e teorie è tornato prepotentemente alla ribalta della riflessione filosofica, sulla scia dei successi provenienti dalle scienze cognitive (linguistica, n...

L’estetica, intesa come scienza della conoscenza sensibile e del bello naturale e artistico, ha indubbiamente a che fare con il giudizio di gusto. In base a che cosa infatti diciamo che un quadro è bello o che una rappresentazione teatrale ci ha colpito? In base al gusto, appunto: al richiamarsi a quel je ne sais quoi che fa sì che apprezziamo le opere d’arte, per esempio. Sarebbe tuttavia legittimo domandarsi che cosa siamo disposti a includere sotto la categoria di “opera (...) d’arte”. Sicuramen... (shrink)

According to some, there is a problem concerning the emotions we feel toward fictional entities such as Anna Karenina, Werther and the like. We feel pity, fear, and sadness toward them, but how is that possible? “We are saddened, but how can we be? What are we sad about? How can we feel genuinely and involuntarily sad, and weep, as we do know that no one has suffered or died?” (Radford, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1975). This is the (...) paradox of fiction which is based on the assumption that emotions, to be genuine and rational, should be directed toward existent beings. But if beliefs about existence are necessary for us to be rationally moved by something, and such beliefs are lacking when we are moved by fiction (because we do not believe fictional characters and events to be real), then our capacity for an emotional response to fiction is irrational. Consequently, our emotional attitude toward future generations should be considered as irrational as well. But is this really the case? Are there good arguments to consider future and fictional entities as similar from this point of view? Or would it be better to distinguish the two? Is there such a thing as a paradox of the future? If so, how does it relate to the more famous paradox of fiction? (shrink)

This paper discusses the intellectual relationship between Meinong and Twardowski, focusing on their ideas about representations and judgements, which are in part extraneous to Franz Brentano’s philosophy. The two philosophers addressed similar topics and their respective positions can be seen to overlap in some regards. This is shown by looking at their views on judgements about relations, intuitive and non‑intuitive representations, and Twardowski’s represented judgements, which display some strong analogies with Meinong’s assumptions.

Carola Barbero | : Je m’intéresse dans cet article aux émotions que nous ressentons lorsque nous lisons une oeuvre de fiction. Certains philosophes pensent que notre implication émotionnelle dans la fiction constitue un paradoxe, et implique soit une forme d’irrationalité, soit la participation à un jeu de « faire semblant ». Ici, je soutiendrai qu’une Théorie de l’Objet à la Meinong, en défendant une approche réaliste des émotions liées la fiction, permet de résoudre adéquatement ce paradoxe de la (...) fiction. | : This essay concerns the emotions that we feel when reading a work of fiction. Some philosophers think that our emotional engagement with fiction gives rise to a paradox and involves either irrationality or participation in a game of make believe. The aim of this work is to show how the paradox of fiction can be dissolved by making use of an Object Theory in a Meinongian style. (shrink)

There are some others whom we will never have the chance to meet because they do not exist: Emma Bovary, Anna Karenina and Nana, for instance. The reason they are something different from us may seem obvious; they are, after all, fictional entities. But what does it mean when we say that they do not exist? That they are nothing at all, or that they are simply different from us? By assuming a realist ontological perspective we will explain what sort (...) of things fictional literary entities are, comparing them both to existing and to non-existing entities that resemble them in some respects (what is the difference between the historical Napoleon and the Napoleon in War and Peace? Are there similarities between fictional entities as created entities and other artifacts?). Finally, we will determine which theory gives the best account of fictional entities as things other than ourselves. (shrink)